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Family law scholars have devoted much attention to equality among
groups of adults and some attention to equality between groups of children.
There has been little exploration, however, of the notion of equality between
adults and children. In this Article, I first explain what it means at a basic,
theoretical level to speak of such equality. I then identify some practical
implications. Finally, I consider why there is great resistance to many prac-
tical implications of children's equality, even among those who would con-
sider themselves advocates for child welfare.
I. WHAT IT MEANS TO TREAT CHILDREN AS EQUAL PERSONS
The law treats children and adults differently in many ways. A theory
of equality between adults and children might help us determine when and
to what extent that is morally appropriate. Everyone would agree that some-
times it is and sometimes it is not.
Most people today, and certainly family law professors, view children
and adults in the abstract as equal in moral status, or as "equal persons."'
This is an implication of the widely held view that all humans are persons
and all persons are of equal moral status.' But what does it mean to say
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law.
1. JAMES G. DWYER, MORAL STATUS AND HUMAN LIFE: THE CASE FOR CHILDREN'S
SUPERIORITY 2 (2011).
2. Historically, and even still today, some have maintained that children are of
lesser status, and even not "persons." See id. Neither view-that children are equal persons
or that children occupy an inferior moral status-has ever had much theoretical support; they
have been more assumed or asserted than demonstrated. See id. at 1-3. And so several years
ago, I set out to develop a comprehensive theory of moral status and then apply it to children.
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children and adults are morally equal or equal persons? What follows from
that premise?
At the most basic level, it means children's and adults' interests matter
equally in moral decision making. No moral actor should treat children's
interests as inherently less important or weighty than identical or similar
interests of adults. That includes state actors, who presumably should act
morally. It would be difficult to determine in every context precisely how to
treat children's interests as of equal weight; children have some interests
different in kind from any that adults have, and vice versa, making some
comparisons difficult if not impossible. It is true also across groups of adults
that some have interests quite unlike and incommensurate with interests of
others. For example, it is not clear how one could compare a woman's inter-
est in not being forced to continue an unwanted pregnancy with any interest
that men have. Also, adults with particular types of disabilities might have
some interests or needs that other persons do not. So the possibility of two
groups of people having non-coextensive sets of interests is not limited to
adults versus children, and it does not make nonsensical or otherwise inapt
the idea of according them equal respect or treating them equally at a fun-
damental level.
One thing we can productively do, in the face of some differences in
interests, is to distinguish fundamental and ulterior interests for both adults
and children,3 and to stipulate that fundamental interests of one person pre-
sumptively trump ulterior interests of another when there is a conflict. For
example, some forms of public expression in which some adults engage
might be modestly disturbing to children who hear it-for example, apoca-
lyptic warnings from a soapbox preacher. But the adults' fundamental inter-
est in expressive liberty might outweigh the non-fundamental interest chil-
dren have in being spared from modest disturbance, and so the law might
appropriately protect the adults' speech rights in such circumstances.
We can also identify some interests that both adults and children pos-
sess and say that if the interests are equally strong for both then they should
Id. I concluded that it is most plausible to view children as occupying a higher moral status
than adults, because an adequate theory of moral status would recognize many attributes as
giving rise to it and because children outdo adults on many of those attributes, such as sen-
tience and "aliveness." Id. at 3. But I will not argue from that unconventional position here.
At a minimum, the book demonstrates that the "children are less than equal persons" view,
which rests on the undefended and self-serving assumption that autonomy is all that matters
to moral status, is untenable. See generally id. So I begin the analysis here with the more
modest and common assumption that children and adults are of equal moral status.
3. This distinction in levels of interest traces to Joel Feinberg. Feinberg gives as
examples of a fundamental or "welfare interest[]": physical health, the integrity and normal
functioning of one's body, basic intellectual abilities, emotional stability, "the capacity to
engage normally in social intercourse," some minimum of financial resources, and "a certain
amount of freedom from interference and coercion." See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 37 (1984).
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receive equally strong legal protection. Sometimes protection of adults'
interests, especially their fundamental interests, takes the form of rights-in
law, as a matter of statute, constitutional provision, or common law. Thus, if
the law, in one form or another, confers on adults rights that protect particu-
lar interests of theirs, and if children have those interests as well and they
are of at least equal importance for children, then the law should also confer
rights on children with respect to those interests, and the rights should be
identical or equivalent, if not stronger (even if subject to override on differ-
ent grounds).
By "equivalent," in characterizing rights as protections of like interests
of children, I mean providing as much presumptive protection for those
interests as adults' rights provide, even if the rights take somewhat different
form in the case of children. As a general matter, many rights of young
children must differ from rights of adults in the manner by which they are
effectuated; whereas adults generally assert their own rights and give con-
tent to the rights themselves by having and expressing preferences, young
children's rights generally must be enforced by a proxy, based on the
proxy's best judgment of what is in the child's best interests.4 For example,
adults have a legal right not to be punched, which they themselves choose to
assert or waive vis-d-vis particular other persons in particular circumstanc-
es, and they themselves enforce that right when violated by lodging a legal
complaint (though they might have an agent, such as an attorney, assist
them in doing so). Similarly, infants have a legal right not to be punched,
only that right must be exercised and enforced by an agent, such as a parent
or child protection agency, perhaps along with an attorney; proceeding pro
se, as we say, is not possible for an infant. The right in its core content, im-
posing a duty on others not to punch, is the same for both. What differs be-
tween adults and children is the mechanism by which the right is effectuat-
ed, and for that reason the right of a child might be deemed equivalent ra-
ther than identical to the right of an adult.'
That is really all the theory one needs to support some fairly robust
critiques of existing laws governing children's lives. To recap: Children's
equal moral status means the law must confer on them protections for their
interests comparable to protections it confers on adults for like or equally
4. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (2004) ("Whenever an infant or incompetent person has
a representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant
or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next
friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as
it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.").
5. For a defense of an interest-protecting conception of rights, with particular focus
on children as rights bearers, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
291 app. (2006).
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weighty interests. When protections take the form of rights, their content
should be similar for both children and adults when identical or similar in-
terests are at stake for both; neither law nor moral deliberation should ac-
cord children weaker rights simply because they are children or on the basis
of their being less autonomous.6 The main difference between children's
rights and adults' rights, when they are in similar circumstances, should be
simply that young children's rights must be effectuated by a proxy.7
II. IMPLICATIONS OF TREATING CHILDREN AS EQUALS
Standing upon this easily constructed but secure theoretical founda-
tion, one can look at a given legally sanctioned social or governmental prac-
tice impacting children and ask: What type of interests do children have at
stake? And: When adults have the same interest or a similar or equally
weighty interest at stake, what protection does the law give them? And then:
Is there any justification for any disparity in treatment that is rational and
respects the equal personhood of children?
Some scholars have written analyses of this sort. For example, in writ-
ing about corporal punishment, Susan Bitensky asks whether children have
interests in bodily integrity, freedom from humiliation, and avoidance of
pain comparable to those interests in adults, and after finding that they do
argues that children should therefore have a right comparable to adults'
right not to be hit, for disciplinary or other purposes.8 Judges have some-
times adopted this line of analysis as well, mostly regarding civil liberties,
such as First Amendment speech rights,9 procedural due process protections
for minors charged with crimes, ° and the liberty to move about unsuper-
6. Their being less autonomous might mean that their interests of a particular
sort-for example, in freedom of religion-are weaker than adults' interests of that sort, or
that they do not have certain interests at all. But when they have an equally strong interest of
a particular sort-for example, in avoiding pain-their moral equality means they should not
be denied equal protection for that interest simply because they are relatively less autono-
mous.
7. When the transition should occur in a person's life from proxy-controlled inter-
est-protecting rights to choice-based rights that the right-holder controls is a complex ques-
tion that I bracket for present purposes.
8. See generally SUSAN H. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION (2006).
9. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (upholding First Amendment speech rights of public high school students and stating
that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate").
10. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 29 (1967) (holding that children have due
process rights entitling them to procedural safeguards prior to confinement in an institution
for juvenile delinquents and stating that "[i]f he had been over 18 and had committed an
offense to which such a sentence might apply, he would have been entitled to substantial
1010 2013:1007
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vised in public." They adopt a starting point of rights equal to those of
adults and then ask if there is special justification for infringing those rights
in the case of minors in some settings, such as a school. 2
Mostly unexplored, though, are the implications of the equal person-
hood premise for parental control over children's physical and intellectual
development, such as their medical care and schooling and for formation
and dissolution of parent-child relationships. One reason for this neglect is
likely that these are contexts in which children's situations appear entirely
unlike that of adults, yet I will explain below why it nevertheless is appro-
priate in these contexts also to rest normative analysis on the equal person-
hood premise.
A. Rights in Ongoing Family Relationships
With respect to the control that legal parents, once the state confers
that status, exercise over children's upbringing, the equal personhood prem-
ise makes problematic not only some specific conduct toward children, such
as corporal punishment, but also the very concept of parental entitlement.
13
As articulated in the American legal system, that concept has entailed a le-
gal liability (i.e., vulnerability to loss of rights) for children. 4 Modem west-
em society rejects in every other context the idea that one person has a right
to control the life of another person, even if the other person is presumed
incapable of controlling his or her own life. 5
With respect to incompetent adults, for example, the persons who ex-
ercise control over certain aspects of their lives-that is, their guardians-
are viewed as fiduciaries rather than right-holders. 6 If the guardians object
to some legal requirement for their decision making or conduct, they must
express that objection in terms of the welfare and rights of their ward and
not in terms of their own entitlement.' To ascribe control rights, rather than
merely a privilege to exercise limited authority, to guardians would mean
subordinating the interests of wards to the interests of guardians, even
rights under the Constitution of the United States as well as under Arizona's laws and consti-
tution").
11. See, e.g., Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593, 596-97 (N.Y. 2009)
(striking down a city's curfew as unconstitutional and stating that "[f]reedom of movement is
the very essence of our free society, setting us apart[;] . . . [f]or an adult, there is no doubt
that this right is fundamental and an ordinance interfering with the exercise of such a right
would be subject to strict scrutiny" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
12. See supra notes 9-11.
13. See James G. Dwyer, Parents'Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents'Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1371, 1378-79 (1994).
14. See id.
15. Id. at 1405-23.
16. See DWYER, supra note 5, at 300.
17. See id. at 80-93; Dwyer, supra note 13, at 1419-20.
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though the interests at stake for wards in connection with their care and ha-
bilitation are presumptively weightier than those at stake for guardians. That
would be inconsistent with treatment of incompetent adults as equal persons
and with the way in which the legal system ordinarily assigns rights. Thus,
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court
rejected a claim by parents of an adult who was in a persistent vegetative
state that they had a First Amendment right to make medical decisions con-
cerning their daughter based on their religious beliefs.' 8 The parents could
claim no entitlement in connection with decision making about their adult
daughter; only the daughter had any rights in the matter, rights necessarily
exercised by proxy but still her rights rather than anyone else's. 9
Why not say that a guardian for an elderly person with dementia has a
right to refuse medical care for the ward based on the guardian's religious
beliefs? One reason is that the strong normative claim a moral or constitu-
tional right entails is deemed fitting only for a person's self-determination
and fundamental interests, which does not include control over the life of
other persons. Another reason is that ascribing to one person a right to con-
trol another would contravene a dignitary interest of the latter. It is generally
deemed incompatible with proper respect for persons to make them objects
of others' rights. An additional reason is that it would increase the likeli-
hood of decisions contrary to the welfare of the incompetent adult, whose
interests in connection with her care are presumed to be greater than anyone
else's interests. When people view their authority as an entitlement, they
naturally feel less constrained to exercise that authority on any basis other
than their own preferences and interests.
It is also true of child rearing that it is not, for parents, a matter of self-
determination.2" Nor is it, from an objective standpoint, a fundamental inter-
est of parents to exercise control over a child's life. Children also have a
dignitary interest in not being treated as an object of someone else's rights.2'
And children, too, are vulnerable to having their welfare sacrificed in con-
nection with central aspects of their lives, such as their medical care or edu-
cation, if the state ascribes to some other persons an entitlement to govern
children's lives, rather than just a privilege to exercise limited authority.22
This is so even if the state endeavors to scale back that entitlement to some
degree by imposing limits, especially if those limits are vaguely worded
(e.g., "neglect," "grievous harm," or "unreasonable"). 3
18. 497 U.S. 261,266-67, 285-87 (1990).
19. See id.
20. Dwyer, supra note 13, at 1406-07.
21. Id. at 1434.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Cor-
poral Punishment of Children: Converging Evidence from Social Science Research and
1012 2013:1007
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Therefore, parents, like guardians for incompetent adults, should be
viewed as fiduciaries, exercising limited authority as a matter of privilege
rather than entitlement, and any resistance they mount to state restrictions
on their caretaking, they should have to express in terms of detriment to the
children rather than in terms of their own entitlement. The Amish parents in
Wisconsin v. Yoder24 should have had to argue, in terms secular courts could
comprehend (i.e., in terms of this-worldly and empirically verifiable well-
being), that attending school would be bad for their children, rather than that
they wanted to act in accordance with their religious beliefs or to make their
children unquestioning adherents to the Amish faith and way of life. And
the Court's analysis of the conflict should have entailed a balancing of
competing interests of the children-for example, continuity of ideological
environment and undisturbed family life versus development of moral au-
tonomy and having broader career options-rather than a balancing of chil-
dren's welfare against a supposed entitlement of Amish adults.
This reasoning extends also to communities that might have collective
preferences regarding child rearing. It is also inconsistent with children's
equal personhood to attribute to groups, including the state or minority cul-
tural communities, a collective right to dictate children's lives." We would
never ascribe to the Amish or to Native American tribes a right to possess
and control the lives of some adults, even though some such groups might
like to have that right. Likewise, we should not attribute to them a right to
possess and control the lives of children. 6
Some practical implications of these conclusions about rights to con-
trol children's lives are not so dramatic. For example, one implication is that
if any state decided to begin regulating private schools in a meaningful way,
to ensure that children in them are receiving an adequate education,27 par-
ents could not assert rights of their own in opposition, but rather would have
International Human Rights Law and Implications for U.S. Public Policy, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 231, 247-48 (discussing courts' varied interpretations of an "unreasonable"
standard in physical abuse cases).
24. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that Amish parents were constitutionally
entitled, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, to an exemption from compulsory
education laws).
25. See JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 102-20
(1998).
26. Thus, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), insofar as it treats certain children
as "tribal resources," constitutes a moral affront to those children. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006)
("Congress finds ... that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children."); see James G. Dwyer, Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, Erasing the Last Vestiges of Human Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 51 (2013),
available at http://www.bu.edulbulawreview/files/2013/1l /DWYER.pdf (critiquing the
ICWA and discussing the Supreme Court decision limiting its application).
27. For documentation that states currently do not do this, see James G. Dwyer, No
Accounting for School Vouchers, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 361, 363-64 (2013).
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to argue that the regulations are somehow contrary to their children's secu-
lar interests. They should argue in legislative fora solely on the basis of
children's interests, and if it becomes necessary to challenge enacted legis-
lation in court, parents could argue that their children have a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right against unwarranted interference
with their guardians' educational choices and that the new school regula-
tions violate that right because they are unjustified on child welfare
grounds. That implication is not of great practical significance, however,
given the existing constitutional boundary between state and parental au-
thority. Even when it has ascribed to parents constitutional rights to control
children's education, the Supreme Court has emphasized that states are nev-
ertheless free to regulate private schools as they see fit, to protect and pro-
mote what the state views as children's educational interests.28 The reason
private schools today are unregulated is that state legislators simply do not
care enough about what happens to children in private schools to demand
academic accountability from those schools.
The same is true with respect to children's medical care. States impose
on parents a legal duty to secure preventive care of certain kinds and to ob-
tain treatment when children are sick or injured. 9 And although nearly all
states have religious exemptions in some of their statutes relating to chil-
dren's medical care,3" Supreme Court doctrine and most decisions of lower
courts embrace the position that states are not constitutionally required to
have such exemptions and that parents are not constitutionally entitled to an
exemption on grounds of religious opposition from medical neglect laws.3'
28. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-15; see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925).
29. See James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child
Welfare and Education Laws As Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objec-
tors, 74 N.C.L. REV. 1321, 1353-54, 1356-57 (1996).
30. See id at 1354, 1359-60.
31. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King Cnty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 390 U.S. 598,
598 (1968), aff'g 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (affirming the lower court's decision
ordering blood transfusions for a child needing surgery over the free exercise objection of
Jehovah's Witness parents); Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139-40 (D. Neb.
2006) (rejecting the parents' free exercise claim for an exemption from a newborn metabolic
screening law); Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 956 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (rejecting a
parental claim to entitlement to a religious exemption to a child immunization law); McCar-
thy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (W.D. Ark. 2002) (same); Wright v. DeWitt Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 385 S.W.2d 644, 647-48 (Ark. 1965) (same); Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816,
819 (Ark. 1964) (same); Anderson v. State, 65 S.E.2d 848, 851-52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951)
(same); Mosier v. Barren Cnty. Bd. of Health, 215 S.W.2d 967, 969 (Ky. 1948) (same);
Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107, 111-13 (Md. 1982) (same); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218,
222-23 (Miss. 1979) (same); Douglas Cnty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 607-08 (Neb. 2005)
(rejecting the parents' free exercise claim for an exemption from a newborn metabolic
screening law); Sadlock v. Bd. of Educ. of Carlstadt, 58 A.2d 218, 222 (N.J. 1948) (rejecting
a parc...l claim to entitlement to a religious exemption to a child immunization law); Com-
1014 2013:1007
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Thus, no dramatic change in judicial doctrine relating to parental control
over children's medical care would necessarily follow from jettisoning the
notion of parents' rights. If legislators support statutory religious exemp-
tions because of a mistaken belief about parents' constitutional rights, then
eliminating the concept of parental entitlement from their thinking could
have a dramatic impact, if it resulted in their acting to eliminate these gra-
tuitous and harmful parent-gratifying exemptions.32
In some other child-rearing contexts, though, instantiating children's
equal personhood might have more immediate effects, because it would
entail not only eliminating parental rights, but also ascribing to children
rights against some currently common practices. Some parental practices
that are now widespread but difficult to justify on child welfare grounds
infringe on negative rights that children ought to possess. Negative rights
generally carry more weight in our legal culture than positive rights such as
a right to education or medical care. I mentioned above corporal punish-
ment, which infringes the negative right against being hit. Another example
is the still-widespread practice of routine male circumcision.33 Such practic-
es that involve affirmative conduct toward children are problematic not only
insofar as their justification rests on an illicit notion of parental entitlement,
but also insofar as they infringe a basic negative right to bodily integrity that
the law should ascribe to children as a matter of moral equality. That right
to bodily integrity should presumptively be equally strong for children and
adults, and so the incursions on children's bodies that spanking and circum-
cising involve could be justified, if at all, only if those who would do it sat-
isfy a very demanding burden of proof-for example, that the incursion is
demonstrably necessary to prevent immediate and serious harm to the child.
Other implications of ascribing to children in the course of family life
rights comparable to those that adults enjoy would require changing the
legal rules in some other areas of family law, at least in some jurisdictions.
For example, just as adults have a right not to relocate if they do not wish to
do so when a fellow family member does, the law presumably should treat
children as entitled not to relocate, even if their custodial parents want to
relocate them, unless this would on the whole be in their best interests, rela-
monwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1153-54, 1156 (Pa. 2000) (rejecting free exercise and
"mature minor" defenses to the parents' manslaughter conviction based on medical neglect).
At most, some courts in older cases established a high threshold of harm avoidance as a
necessary basis for a court's ordering of treatment. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 1399-1401.
32. See generally Rita Swan, On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to
Medical Care: Can This Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 73 (1998).
33. For a child welfare cost-benefit analysis of these practices, see Gershoff & Bit-
ensky, supra note 23. See also Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to
Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant Children?:
The Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87
(1998).
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tive to the available alternatives.34 When the only alternative to relocating
with parents is to be placed in the care of non-parents, it is almost always in
children's interests on the whole to relocate with their parents.35 But in a
post-divorce context, this right of children might dictate a change of custody
from a parent who plans to relocate to a parent who does not plan to relo-
cate.36 The usual analysis of relocation disputes between parents in terms of
rights of and fairness to the adults involved would be inapposite;3 7 chil-
dren's right to the residential decision that is best for them all-things-
considered would control.
On the flip side of the topic of residence, children should, like adults,
be ascribed a right to move out of a dangerous and dysfunctional home or
neighborhood, even if that means separating from a family member who
insists on living in such a place.38 Child-centered justifications for infringing
that right-for example, that separating from a parent who insists on living
in that home or neighborhood would be even worse than continued exposure
to the dangers in the current environment-would be legitimate. But a sup-
posed right of parents to possess their children or to dictate where their chil-
dren live would not be a legitimate justification.
Similarly, just as an adult woman has a right to leave a relationship
with a man who repeatedly speaks in a way demeaning of women, a girl
should have a similar right in the context of child-custody decision making.
A court deciding custody between her mother and a father who repeatedly
makes misogynist comments should take into account the harmful conse-
quences for her of the father's speech, and the court should not attribute to
the father any right against incurring a "custody penalty" because of his
speech.39 Likewise, it should count against a mother in a custody battle that
34. See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Self-Determination and Children's Custody: A
New Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children's Family Life, 54 ARiz. L. REV.
79, 98-101 (2012).
35. Id. at 98.
36. Id. at98-101.
37. See, e.g., Merle H. Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes
over Parental Relocation, 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1747, 1753-57 (2007) (describing the cur-
rent analysis used in relocation disputes).
38. See, e.g., Linda L. Bryant & James G. Dwyer, Promising Protection: 911 Call
Records As Foundation for Family Violence Intervention, 102 Ky. L.J. 49 (2013) (discussing
the right of the child not to be forced to live in a home with recurrent domestic violence);
James G. Dwyer, No Place for Children: Addressing Urban Blight and Its Impact on Chil-
dren Through Child Protection Law, Domestic Relations Law, and "Adult-Only " Residential
Zoning, 62 ALA. L. REV. 887, 925-28 (2011) (discussing the right of children not to live in
dangerous and dysfunctional neighborhoods).
39. Thus, Eugene Volokh's argument for protecting parental speech in such cases is
mistaken, and its fault lies in failing to appreciate the implications of children's equal per-
sonhood. Dwyer, supra note 34, at 108-10. See generally Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child
Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (2006).
1016 2013:1007
Equality Between Adults and Children
she routinely denigrates males in front of her son; a ten-year-old male, like a
thirty-year-old male, should have a legal right to avoid such speech.4"
B. Rights in Formation and Dissolution of Family Relationships
The most dramatic implications of children's equal personhood, how-
ever, pertain to the more fundamental child-welfare issues of formation and
dissolution of legal parent-child relationships-that is, to whom state laws
assign parental status and when states should sever legal parent-child rela-
tionships that they have created.4' In this realm, almost no one thinks in
terms of comparing rights of children with the rights of adults.42
But that is a mistake, because obviously adults also form and dissolve
family relationships and in doing so have at stake many interests similar to
those that children have at stake in connection with family relationships.
Indeed, with respect to incompetent adults, the state creates legal family-
like relationships (that between guardian and ward) that are structurally the
same as the parent-child relationship, with one member of the relationship
caring for and having authority over the life of another.43 But even intimate
partnerships between adults (i.e., horizontal rather than vertical relation-
ships) serve interests of adults that are of a kind which parent-child rela-
tionships also serve. And in all of these just-mentioned contexts, all adults,
whether autonomous or not, enjoy quite strong and well-recognized consti-
tutional rights in connection with formation and dissolution of family rela-
tionships.'
In connection with state formation of children's relationships, then, we
should first ask: Do children have at stake in the decision as to with whom
they will form a parent-child relationship interests that are the same as or
similar to the interests adults have in connection with their decisions as to
whether and with whom they will form any family relationships? Consider a
40. I am not implying here that it is not detrimental for boys to hear misogynist
comments or for girls to hear things denigrating to males as a group. The examples I offer
simply seem stronger examples of detriment.
41. See James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the
Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 785 (2009).
42. One arguable exception was a brief flurry of interest in the 1990s in children's
ability to petition for termination of their legal relationship with their parents, characterized
by some as the right to "divorce" one's parents. This scholarly discussion ensued from a
decision of a court in Florida granting a teenage boy standing to petition for termination of
parental rights (TPR) so that he could formalize the de facto family relationship he had
formed with another set of adults. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993). But what was in dispute in Kingsley was really just the procedural question
of whether a minor should have standing to seek TPR, not what the substantive rule for TPR
should be.
43. See DWYER, supra note 5, at 80-93 (describing the law governing this process).
44. Dwyer, supra note 41, at 773-89.
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comparison with adults' decisions to marry. Both the parent-child relation-
ship and a marriage satisfy important psycho-emotional needs for the people
in them-for example, to receive loving attention and physical contact, to
feel and express love, to have a special place in the life of another, and to
have someone with whom to talk and share experiences. Both relationships
typically also provide material benefits, sometimes primarily to one party
and later to the other.
And as to both psycho-emotional and material interests, children's in-
terests impacted by a parent-child relationship are generally weightier than
the interests adults have at stake in getting married: The interests children
have at stake when state laws determine who their legal parents will be are
clearly fundamental. One especially important and distinctive need that in-
fants have is to form a secure attachment to a nurturing caregiver, and being
thrust into a legal relationship with adults who are incapable of providing
this is likely seriously to undermine a child's prospects for a healthy and
fulfilling life.45 In contrast, though courts have often spoken of adults having
a fundamental interest in legal marriage, that is not very plausible today;
today legal marriage is entirely unnecessary to having an intimate relation-
ship and cohabiting. 6 Legal marriage today has little real impact on peo-
ple's lived experience; the consequences of that status are primarily finan-
cial.47 In contrast, children's lives typically are largely determined by which
adults have legal custody of them.
Even if one compares formation of parent-child relationships not with
legal marriage but simply with formation of intimate partnerships between
adults (whether or not legally formalized), and even conceding that adults
have important interests at stake in formation of intimate partnerships, it
must be acknowledged that children's developmental needs are at least as
important and probably more so. Custodians largely determine the quality of
a child's experience of the world and whether basic needs for safety, nour-
ishment, and attachment are satisfied, and this in turn largely determines a
child's life course. One's choice of marital partner can be momentous, but
it generally does not impact fundamental well-being to the same degree as
does the state's selection of a newborn child's parents.
What follows, then, from this assumption that children have at least as
much at stake in connection with the state's decision about their family rela-
tionships as adults have in making decisions themselves about their intimate
partnerships? Recall the conclusion earlier that similar interests of similar
45. See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Con-
signment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 415-28 (2008).
46. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for
Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 1161, 1168-70, 1173 (2006).
47. Id. at 1166-73.
48. See Dwyer, supra note 45, at 419-27.
1018 2013:1007
Equality Between Adults and Children
importance presumptively should receive equal protection, and presump-
tively should give rise to equal or equivalent rights. If we ask, then, what
rights adults have in connection with forming family relationships, the an-
swer is that they have (1) a right to make themselves available to (almost)
anyone, and (2) an absolute right to make themselves unavailable to any-
one-that is, to refuse a relationship with any other particular persons. We
adults have this second right regardless of how strongly any other person
wants to have a relationship with us, regardless of how the relationship
might serve the other's interests, regardless of what kind of connection an-
other person might think they have with us, regardless of the effect our rela-
tionship choices could have on a cultural or racial community or socio-
economic class, and regardless of whether our choice might impede societal
progress toward some abstract aim like racial equality. We are entitled to
base our choice entirely on our own interests.
It would be unthinkable, for example, for a government authority to
tell an adult that he or she may not refuse a relationship with another adult
despite that adult's unfitness as a spouse (e.g., because of a propensity to
partner violence) because the other adult has had a difficult life and is not to
blame for being unfit. Or even for a government authority to mandate, more
modestly, that one must allow an abusive partner some time to attempt re-
habilitation before one makes a final decision about whether to continue the
relationship. It would be unthinkable to tell someone whom a Native Amer-
ican tribe claims is a member that he or she must marry someone who is
also a tribe member, because otherwise the tribe will grow weaker, as mem-
bers choose to form families with outsiders and to move away. Even merely
to pressure or try to shame adults into forming relationships on such
grounds would be unacceptable.
Turning back to the parent-child relationship, it follows straightfor-
wardly that the right of any adult with respect to formation of such a rela-
tionship should be just simply the right to choose to be available for it or not
(a right adults do currently enjoy).49 It follows also that children have an
absolute right to refusal of such a relationship as to any particular adult if
forming the relationship with that adult would be contrary to their welfare, a
right that for newborns simply must be exercised by a proxy. Because chil-
dren have the most fundamental interests at stake in the choice of who will
49. Adults are legally free to refuse a social relationship with any child, even a bio-
logical offspring. Courts will not order birth parents to take custody of or even visit their
offspring. The law does impose a legal relationship on unwilling biological parents, but the
sole duty that legal relationship entails is one of financial support. See James G. Dwyer, A
Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their Relationships,
11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 937, 952-53 (2003).
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parent them, they equally deserve constitutional protection of their interests,
and that means equal or equivalent rights."
A similar analysis would apply to dissolution of relationships. The law
has always made exit from non-marital relationships between adults easy
and unrestrained, and today that is largely also true of marriages.5 We
adults who marry have the freedom to end the relationship based on nothing
more than a belief that doing so would be in our best interests. It is no long-
er necessary to prove that one's spouse engaged in particular types of seri-
ously blameworthy conduct; it is enough that the relationship is simply not
"working" for one of the spouses. 2 Adults are deemed to have a sufficiently
strong interest in not being stuck in a dysfunctional marriage that they are
entitled to sever the relationship against the other person's wishes, regard-
less of how much suffering this might cause the other person or third parties
such as the couple's children.
Respecting children's equal moral status should mean that their inter-
est in discontinuing a family relationship with an adult, when the relation-
ship is on the whole contrary to their welfare, receives comparable protec-
tion. If a particular parent-child relationship is not in the child's best inter-
ests, taking into account all relevant factors and what realistic relationship
alternatives are available for the child, then the child should have an abso-
lute right to exit the relationship. The right would, again, simply have to be
exercised by a proxy, such as a child protection agency or a guardian ad
litem.
Existing statutory rules for termination of parental rights (TPR), which
are quite protective of parents' desires to remain in a parental role,53 thus
fail fully to respect children's equal personhood. The legal rule for TPR
should be simply that ending the relationship would be in the child's best
interests. Everything that empirical evidence shows is relevant to a child's
welfare should factor into that determination. 4 This would include a child's
emotional connection to an existing parent, whatever shortcoming the par-
ent might have. It would also include a child's interest in being part of a
biologically related family. Moreover, it might be best for children if courts
applied a fairly high evidentiary standard for finding the best-interests test
met-for example, "clear and convincing."55 But there is no justification for
"balancing" children's rights against the interests or supposed rights of par-
50. See generally Dwyer, supra note 41 (presenting an extended argument for this
position).
51. Lynn D. Wardle, What Is Marriage?, 6 WHITrIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 53,
80 (2006).
52. Id.
53. See Dwyer, supra note 49, at 954-64.
54. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 45, at 427.
55. This is the standard the U.S. Supreme Court constitutionally required in order to
respect the rights of parents. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
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ents in this context. The law does not compel adults to compromise their
welfare for the sake of others when deciding whether to exit a relationship,56
and it would be inconsistent with children's equal personhood to impose
such a compromise upon them."
Concededly, effectuating rights by proxy, as must be done with young
children, presents practical difficulties and raises concerns about the imper-
fection of the proxy. But such practical difficulties or concerns cannot j usti-
fy entirely jettisoning the approach of ascribing to children rights equivalent
to those we adults insist on for ourselves, as many defenders of parental
entitlement are wont to do. 8 Significantly, we do not make that unprincipled
leap in regard to decision making for incompetent adults who need to be in
the custody of a caretaker, which raises very similar difficulties and con-
cerns.59 Instead, we trust state actors to do the best they can faithfully to
implement incompetent adults' rights, because assigning rights instead to
someone else hardly seems more likely to serve well the interests of the
incompetent adults. We should do the same concerning children.
People are generally accepting of this when thinking about the state's
creating parent-child relationships by adoption. In that context, one rarely
hears concerns about the impracticality of assessing potential parents' abil-
ity to care for and provide a good home for a child, nor about the compe-
tence of state actors to wield such power over people's lives.6" It is, I think,
principally the unfamiliarity of the idea of excluding some biological par-
56. Wardle, supra note 51, at 80.
57. A seeming counterexample might be legal rules precluding legal parents from
voluntarily severing their legal tie to children if that would be detrimental to the child. See,
e.g., In re D.W.K., 365 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Iowa 1985). But those legal rules do not have an
effect on parents that comes close to the effect on children of legal rules precluding them
from exiting a relationship with an unfit parent who wants to remain in the relationship. The
effect on parents who want out is solely financial; the state will continue to impose a child
support obligation but will not force the parents to associate in any way with a child. In con-
trast, trapping a child in a dysfunctional legal parent-child relationship means either that the
child must live with the parent or that the child must live in the temporary and often detri-
mental situation of foster care while the state gives the parent time to improve.
58. See DWYER, supra note 5, at 213-39 (responding to critics of best-interests deci-
sion making for children).
59. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 41, at 773-80.
60. The principal exceptions have been concerns about prejudice-driven exclusion
of some categories of people from eligibility to adopt at all or to adopt particular children-
specifically, race matching, a practice motivated by an impulse to protect a subordinated
community, and prejudice against homosexuals. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do
Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
1163, 1201-06 (1991). Significantly, many who oppose such exclusions do so in terms of
their violating children's rights or negatively impacting children, rather than in terms of
adults' rights. See, e.g., id. I have never seen complaints about the criteria adoption agencies
use for assessing the quality of parenting and home environment for applicants or about how
agencies implement those criteria.
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ents from legal relationships with newbom children that leads people to
invoke state incompetence or untrustworthiness as an objection.
How might we go about operationalizing children's rights in connec-
tion with formation of parent-child relationships? For a start, we should
identify and exclude grossly unfit parents more systematically than we now
do. When adults contemplate forming intimate partnerships, they generally
put substantial effort into learning about potential partners' backgrounds
and current strengths and weaknesses. Today they are likely to do so more
systematically, with the prevalence of Internet dating sites and the availabil-
ity of criminal records online. A woman seeking a male partner would un-
doubtedly want to know if a particular man has a history of violence toward
other women or is currently addicted to drugs, and such red flags would
undoubtedly be enough for her to refuse the relationship. We could do the
same for newborn children who are "seeking" an adult for family formation,
using information already in the state's hands; a simple computer program
could compare all birth records that a state's health or vital-records agency
receives with child maltreatment and criminal record databases that states
maintain.6 Red flags such as a history of violence toward other children or
current drug addiction might not trigger immediate rejection of a birth par-
ent as a candidate for legal parenthood, but it could trigger an in-depth and
individualized assessment of whether entering a parent-child relationship
with that adult is in the newborn child's best interests, taking into account
all relevant aspects of a child's well-being. In the case of chronically and
deeply dysfunctional birth parents, this assessment should lead to rejection.
The state should never confer legal parent status on those adults, as to their
biological offspring or any other children.
III. WHY EQUALITY FOR CHILDREN TRIGGERS OPPOSITION
There is generally great resistance to thinking about children's rela-
tionships and upbringing in the way I have suggested above-that is, to
extending to children the rights we demand for ourselves. The prevailing
mode of analysis regarding parental control and regarding formation and
dissolution of parent-child relationships is sui generis, treating that relation-
ship as if it were completely unlike any other. By falsely treating the par-
ent-child relationship as in all respects unique, objectors obviate the need
for comparison, and indeed often writers seem to perceive no need to appeal
to general principles or objective considerations at all. As a result, we see in
the legal, policy, and social science literatures many undefended, unprinci-
61. At least one state, Michigan, is now doing some form of background check on
birth parents. See generally Terry V. Shaw et al., Child Welfare Birth Match: Timely Use of
Child Welfare Administrative Data to Protect Newborns, 7 J. PUB. CHILD. WELFARE 217
(2013).
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pled normative claims concerning children, and about rights of legal or bio-
logical parents.62 One especially telling example is the common tendency to
speak of child rearing as a matter of parents' autonomy.63 With respect to no
other relationship do people mistakenly speak of one member's control over
the other as a matter of autonomy-that is, of self-determination.'
Even those who think children should have some rights tend to assume
that children should have a special set of rights of their own, that it would
be nonsensical or inadequate, or perhaps asking too much, to just extend to
children the same rights that adults enjoy. There is a huge literature on
"children's rights," as a distinct body of rights, and not so much on "apply-
ing universal rights to children." I have argued in connection with interna-
tional adoption that this way of thinking is dangerous for children, for the
same reason it was dangerous for women during and after coverture to as-
sume they needed a special set of legal protections rather than the same as
those enjoyed by the normative person of a legal system (i.e., a male
adult).65 Children might need special rights in some realms, such as educa-
tion, but there is a danger in always assuming that to be so. The problem is
that "special" rights for a powerless group are likely to be inferior and might
even be harmful rather than protective.
62. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 172, 179, 199 (1993) (arguing for greater
parental control over the education of children as an aspect of the parents' religious "auton-
omy"); id. at 174 (arguing that parents should be entitled to remove their children from cer-
tain components of public school education, such as sex education, to which they have reli-
gious objections, because this will help preserve "epistemological diversity" in our society);
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 152 (1978) ("[T]he right to form one's child's values,
one's child's life plan and the right to lavish attention on that child are extensions of the
basic right not to be interfered with in doing these things for oneself."); Ferdinand Schoe-
man, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 6,
17 (1980) ("To set terms for.., parenting more stringent than required for the protection of
children from abuse and neglect constitutes an interference in a person's claim to establish
intimate relations except on the society's terms."); Edgar Page, Parental Rights, I J. APPLIED
PHIL. 187, 195-96 (1984).
63. See, e.g., Elaine M. Chiu, The Culture Differential in Parental Autonomy, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1773, 1777 (2008); Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparental)
Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 9 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 69, 74 (2001) (asserting that
some third-party child-visitation statutes do not "meaningfully protect parental autonomy");
Diane L. Abraham, California's Stepparent Visitation Statute: For the Welfare of the Child,
or a Court-Opened Door to Legally Interfere with Parental Autonomy: Where Are the Con-
stitutional Safeguards?, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 125, 126 (1997); Joseph Gold-
stein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86
YALE L.J. 645, 646-47 (1977).
64. On the incoherence of "parental autonomy," see James G. Dwyer, Children's
Interests in a Family Context-A Cautionary Note, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1063-64
(1999).
65. See generally James G. Dwyer, Inter-Country Adoption and the Special Rights
Fallacy, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2014).
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A sameness/difference debate, involving in part the question whether a
historically subordinated group should be legally assimilated to the domi-
nant group or instead should receive different treatment, has played out, it
seems, in many progressive movements-for example, in the feminist
movement, with its divide among liberal, cultural, and radical feminists.66
Children might be just another group for whom this question arises: Is it
better in some sense to treat them simply as persons and apply to them, in-
sofar as possible, all the rules that apply to persons generally, or instead to
treat them as a separate category of humans to which a separate set of rules
ordinarily should apply? The predominant approach today implicitly as-
sumes the latter, but I believe the future of the field of "child law" or "chil-
dren theory" scholarship lies in exploration of the former possibility.
In exploring that possibility, scholars will need to address some of
these questions: Is there really something about the adult rights vs. child
rights analysis that makes it categorically different from women vs. men, or
blacks vs. whites, homosexual vs. heterosexual, disabled vs. normal, in the
sense that some factual difference between adults and children really makes
a wholesale difference in normative treatment ineradicable and unavoida-
ble? Is there really some hard and fast dissimilarity that makes comparisons
like those I make simply inapt or irrational? Conversely, should history with
other struggles, like that for equal treatment of women or against giving
lesser rights to people with disabilities, make everyone less confident about
their fixed assumptions?
In short, is there any persuasive reason not to change our normative
framework so that there is always a presumption, in every context, that chil-
dren have rights equal or equivalent to those of adults, such that the burden
of justification falls on anyone who would deny that? At some point with all
the equality struggles, there had to be a flip. Women at some point argued:
Why do we have to prove we are the same, rather than men having to prove
we are different and that any difference justifies giving us lesser rights? The
burden of proof switched to the side of inequality. Why should that not be
true also when thinking about the rights of children?
Scholars, policy makers, and other adults might be resistant to think-
ing in terms of equal rights for children because they fear the impact of do-
ing so on adults, and in particular on parents. The abstract idea of equal
respect might be appealing, but the thought of the state's frustrating some
parents' wishes as to how they raise their children or denying parents even
the opportunity to raise their offspring likely triggers a negative gut reac-
tion. Adults might tend to identify and empathize strongly with other adults,
imagining themselves in the situation of those adults. This is especially like-
66. See John Capps, Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Sameness-Difference Debate,
32 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE Soc'y 65, 66-75 (1996).
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ly when they share some additional characteristic with those other adults,
such as being of the same gender or race, or some important commitment,
such as to religious faith. It is also more likely when they feel special sym-
pathy for a group that the parents belong to, such as "the poor" or "persons
of minority race," not because they also belong to that group but because
they view the group as victimized by social injustice and, in fact, view the
parents' predicament vis-d-vis their offspring as itself the product of social
injustice-for example, where parental unfitness is the outcome of a life of
deprivation, danger, and denial of opportunity.
It would seem much more difficult or unlikely for adults to identify
and empathize instead or primarily with the children who might suffer be-
cause of parental ideology or unfitness. Those who participate in the theo-
retical, legal, and social science debates are unlikely themselves to have
suffered as children from maltreatment, and in any case their childhood is
an ever-receding memory, whereas their adult experience is immediately
accessible. I am frequently asked when I present arguments against parents'
rights and for more aggressive protection of children's welfare whether I am
a parent myself or whether I have spoken to any of the parents whose situa-
tions I am discussing. I am never asked whether I was ever a child in a simi-
lar situation or whether I have spoken with any children who are in the situ-
ation I am addressing. An adult audience is likely first, and perhaps last, to
turn its empathic gaze toward other adults, and not toward children. This
psychological disposition gives rise to a presumption against any policy
measures that inflict suffering on adults because of their beliefs or misfor-
tune, and in turn against any normative arguments that lead to such
measures. It also generates a tendency to look for or fabricate any facts that
count against such measures, and on the other hand to reject factual premis-
es that support such measures absent irrefutable evidence. It leads to cate-
gorical rejection of proposals rather than careful consideration of whether
they might be better tailored.
One particular policy area that illustrates this phenomenon is the
quickly expanding practice of the state's placing babies into prisons to live
with incarcerated birth mothers. Advocates for incarcerated women are
pushing legislatures to create "prison nurseries" and claiming that having
newborn babies reside for one to three years in prison with their mothers is
conducive to the children's welfare.67 They make this claim about children
despite the absence of empirical evidence to support it, and they ignore the
numerous reasons why one might suppose it is not a good thing for children
to start life in a prison and to form a legal parent-child relationship with
someone who just began a prison sentence and who likely suffers from se-
67. See James G. Dwyer, Jailing Black Babies, 2014 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 1).
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vere mental health problems and drug addiction.6" Prison nursery propo-
nents do not support a policy of individualized best-interests decision mak-
ing for such a newborn by a competent authority, with placement in prison
just one option among a range of choices that includes placement for adop-
tion, but rather endorse giving the birth mother the power to decide if her
newborn baby will join her in prison.
Nowhere in the advocacy literature promoting imprisonment of babies
is there any consideration of whether children, like adults, have a right to
enter into the legal family relationships that, among those available to them,
are the most promising for them. Nor is there any consideration of whether
children, like adults, might have a constitutional right that places limits on
the power of the state to put them in prison.69 The only mention of rights is
the question-begging assertion that children have a right to be with "their
mothers," without any consideration of whether someone other than the
birth mother should be the legal and social mother when a baby is born to an
incarcerated woman. There is no effort to generalize the arguments that are
made; rather they treat the babies' situations as if it were sui generis, entire-
ly unlike the situations of any other persons. Yet it seems unlikely that any-
one would embrace more general positions like: "The state should put in-
competent persons in prison to live with biologically related inmates if that
might reduce criminal recidivism and might be good in some ways for some
such incompetent persons."
It is not entirely an adult vs. child phenomenon that explains the re-
sistance to thinking in terms of children's equality. There is also an intense
attachment to some vague sense that biological relatedness dramatically
alters the normative framework of policymaking. There is little resistance to
thinking in terms of children's rights in contexts when children's interests
are not in conflict with those of their biological parents. Thus, for example,
there is no resistance to the idea that the state may make adults compete
68. See Lili Garfinkel, Female Offenders and Disabilities, in WOMEN AND GIRLS IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICY ISSUES AND PRACTICE STRATEGIES 39-1, 39-3 (Russ
Immarigeon ed., 2006) ("[T]he typical female offender had been hospitalized at least once
for a psychiatric episode (usually a suicide attempt), had been violent in a school setting, and
had a diagnosis of ODD (oppositional-defiant disorder). Because of girls' histories of abuse
and violence it is likely that they also have abuse-related disorders such as PTSD .... ");
Diane S. Young & Liete C. Dennis, The Complex Needs of Mentally Il Women in County
Jails, in WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICY ISSUES AND PRACTICE
STRATEGIES, supra, at 42-1, 42-2 to 42-3 (stating that the "vast majority ... had previously
been in psychiatric and/or alcohol or drug treatment" and two-thirds had received psychiatric
medication in the past); JESSICA MEYERSON, CHRISTA OTrESON & KRYSTEN LYNN RYBA,
CHILDHOOD DISRUPTED: UNDERSTANDING THE FEATURES AND EFFECTS OF MATERNAL
INCARCERATION 1 (2010) (noting incarcerated mothers have higher rates of mental illness and
substance abuse than incarcerated fathers).
69. I argue that children do have such a right. See Dwyer, supra note 67 (manuscript
at 52-61).
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with each other for adoption of a child whose biological parents have had
their rights terminated voluntarily or involuntarily; that the state should se-
lect adoptive parents for a child based solely on the child's best interests;
and that in doing so the state may encroach upon adoption applicants' pri-
vacy (inspecting their homes and supervising their interactions with a child),
religious and intellectual freedom (e.g., rejecting applicants who would sub-
ject an adopted daughter to authoritarian sexist teaching), and child-rearing
freedom (e.g., adoption rules prohibiting use of corporal punishment prior to
finalization of an adoption).70
I hesitate to attribute to anyone the archaic view that biological parents
own their offspring as if they were property; it would be difficult to find
anyone today who seriously expresses that view. But it is difficult to explain
the vast difference in attitudes that most people display as between adoption
policy and policies relating to unfit birth parents except by attributing to
them an inchoate belief that biological parents have some entitlement to
possession and enjoyment of their offspring independently of whether that
is good for a child. Biology is relevant to children's welfare in our society;
having a biological connection with one's parents typically becomes psy-
chologically significant to children at some point in their lives, if for no
other reason than "being normal" has some significance for most older chil-
dren.7 But it cannot plausibly be regarded as of such monumental im-
portance to children's welfare that it fully explains this vast difference in
attitudes or justifies state decisions such as placing newborn offspring of
dysfunctional, incarcerated women into adult prisons rather than into adop-
tive homes.
This stubborn belief in biological parents' entitlement to their off-
spring cannot rationally co-exist with a belief in children's equal person-
hood, and this suggests that most people have not really embraced the latter
belief. Most people appear to operate unconsciously, without articulating
precise distinctions, on an assumption that there is a continuum in moral
status running from quintessential property, such as an automobile, to quin-
tessential personhood, represented by autonomous adults. They place differ-
ent types of animals in various places in between those extremes, mostly
based on their relative affinity to autonomous adults, and children occupy a
location somewhere in between household pets, which are the most favored
animals but still subject to "ownership," and autonomous adult humans.
Young children operate cognitively at a level that to adult human observers
might appear to resemble that of dogs and cats, but they have a potential to
become autonomous human adults that dogs and cats do not have, and so
70. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGs. 290-9-2.06(3), (7), (10) (2013); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 8612(c) (West 2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/14(e) (2013). -
71. See generally H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute
Parents, 37 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133 (1964).
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they get placed in between those two categories in adults' unconscious mor-
al ranking.72
There might, then, be a disjuncture today between how most people
really think about children and their express endorsement of the proposition
that children are equal persons. It is a common phenomenon, actually, for
our express views to run ahead of our commitments, when giving full effect
to our intellectual conclusions would require giving up some advantage we
currently enjoy. This has been true for some men who have endorsed wom-
en's equality, for some whites who have expressed support in the abstract
for racial equality, and for some who acknowledge the force of arguments
for animal rights. It will undoubtedly long remain true with respect to equal-
ity for children that there will be much cheap talk but not full commitment
to effectuating its implications.
CONCLUSION
"Children are equal persons" is easy to say, but the academy has bare-
ly begun to study and endorse the implications of that proposition. The peo-
ple best positioned to conduct that study might be family law professors.
But family law professors are almost uniformly advocates for women who
give lexical priority to feminist positions, and the reality is that some impli-
cations of children's equal personhood are in conflict with some feminist
positions-for example, relating to custodial parent relocation after divorce,
state intervention to prevent exposure of children to domestic violence, and
placing children in prisons rather than adoptive homes. Family law academ-
ics are also almost uniformly liberal in a broader sense, and the reality is
that some implications of children's equal personhood are in conflict with
liberal sympathy for disadvantaged groups-for example, because they in-
clude denying legal parent status more often to dysfunctional birth parents,
who are disproportionately poor and of minority race,73 and thus increasing
the suffering these adults endure. Substantial progress toward realization of
children's equal personhood might occur only after the family law academy
openly acknowledges and directly addresses these conflicts among com-
mitments.
72. See DWYER, supra note 1, at 95-117 (critiquing theorists who treat higher cogni-
tive functions as the sole basis for moral status).
73. Cf Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Wel-
fare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REv. 871, 910-18 (2009) (discuss-
ing studies documenting the disproportionate occurrence of child maltreatment in poor and
minority-race families).
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